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When Should Philosophers Be Silent?
JASON DECKER AND CHARLES TALIAFERRO
Abstract
Are there general precepts governing when philosophers should not conduct inquiry on
a given topic? When, if ever, should a philosopher just be silent? In this paper we look at
a number of practical, epistemic, and moral arguments for philosophical silence. Some
are quite general, and suggest that it is best never to engage in philosophical inquiry,
while others are more domain – or context – specific. We argue that these arguments
fail to establish their conclusions. We do, however, try to identify and defend several
substantive constraints on philosophical dialogue and inquiry. In practice, though,
respecting these constraints needn’t lead to much philosophical silence.

1. Introduction
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein famously claimed
that ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’.1 If there
are any analytic statements, such a claim comes quite close, though it
falls a bit short. Just because you cannot speak about a topic, thing
or event, it does not follow that you must be silent. You could beat a
drum or cry or make all sorts of noise about the topic (perhaps even
producing a noisy verbal latter that can later be kicked away).
Leaving aside such options, are there general precepts about when
philosophers should not conduct inquiry or dialogue on some given
topic? When should philosophers be silent?
Some philosophers do claim (with conviction) that certain topics
should be set aside. In a recent book on the problem of suffering
for a theistic worldview, for example, Eleonore Stump rejects in principle any engagement with reflection on the Holocaust, which, she
says, is not a fitting subject ‘for the academic exploration of the
problem of evil’. She writes:
Although it is vitally important to remember the Holocaust and
to reflect deeply on it, taking it simply as one more example or
counter-example in academic disputation on the problem of
evil strikes me as unspeakably awful. It is enough for me that
1

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London:
Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1922), 189.
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I am a member of the species that propagated this evil. Stricken
awe in the face of it seems to me the only response possible.2
Some philosophers have argued that there are times when one should
not engage in philosophical reflection of, for example, impartiality
and moral duty due to practical necessity (doing philosophy under
certain circumstances would be having ‘one thought too many’).
Still others argue that some types of philosophy should not be practiced either due to our lack of competence to address some topics or
due to the inevitable incoherence and obscurity of the philosophical
concepts involved.
Stump’s claim, Wittgenstein’s famous lines about remaining
silent, and various claims about when philosophy should not be practiced, invite the question (or, as our students would say – and we
would resist in vain – beg the question) of whether there are any principles that may provide guidance concerning when philosophers
should remain silent or forgo inquiry. In this paper our task is to
identify and assess philosophically interesting potential constraints
on inquiry.
You might be worried that our question (when should philosophers
be silent?) is – as yet, anyway – too ambiguous to be sensibly addressed. One often hears of different ‘oughts’. We are told that
there are (at the very least) practical, moral, and epistemic oughts,
and questions about what we ought to do (or should do) must
always – at least implicitly – be indexed to a particular ought. If
you want to kill us, you ought, practically speaking, to put cyanide
in our coffee, whereas this is surely not the case morally speaking.
On the other hand, some philosophers have thought that this talk
of various ‘ought’s and ‘should’s is wrongheaded. Judith Thomson,
for instance, argues that ‘ought’ and ‘should’ are not, in fact, multiply
ambiguous.3 There is no genuine sense of ‘ought’, she holds, for
which it’s true that if you want to kill us, you ought to put cyanide
in our coffee. If you want to kill us, it’s not the case that you ought
to put cyanide in our coffee; you ought rather to seek out some
moral guidance (and perhaps pay someone to restrain your evil hand).
We do not wish to take a side in this debate. Hoping to rise above it,
we will focus on all-things-considered oughts and shoulds. (If you
think that these are the only genuine oughts and shoulds, so much
the better.) Still, we can see that true ought and should claims are
2

Eleonore Stump, Wandering in darkness: Narrative and the problem of
suffering (Oxford Clarendon Press, 2010), 16.
3
Judith Thomson, Normativity (Chicago: Open Court, 2008).
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sometimes grounded in primarily practical considerations, whereas
other times they are grounded in primarily epistemic, conceptual or
moral considerations. Thus, when we consider arguments for the
claim that philosophers ought to be silent in certain situations – or
about certain topics – we can sort them roughly into practical,
broadly epistemic, and moral arguments. We will consider what we
take to be some interesting arguments in each category without claiming to have hit on all of the interesting ones (and without claiming that
the dividing lines between our categories are sharp).
2. Practical Worries
Most of the ordinary practical constraints on speech and inquiry
apply in philosophical contexts. If you are a brain surgeon carrying
out a dangerous operation, it would be just as inappropriate for you
to discuss the merits of realism versus nominalism as it would be
for you to discuss real estate (assuming this would not serve to
somehow enhance the success of the operation). Your attention –
and the attention of your colleagues – really ought to be focused elsewhere if you’re going to do your job effectively. Indeed, if you’re the
sort of surgeon that ignores this particular kind of practical matter,
your problem is not merely practical; it’s moral.
Many of the practical conversational constraints identified by Paul
Grice also apply to philosophy, as much as to ordinary speech.4 Just
as excessive details in a conversation when changing a tire would be at
least odd, if not inappropriate and misleading (‘please hand me that
hammer, a metal object that is green and next to your animal
body…’), it would be at least odd, if not inappropriate, to introduce
zombie thought experiments and the problem of other minds during
a public, political debate. The inappropriateness in these cases is not a
moral inappropriateness; it’s an inappropriateness from the practical
standpoint of trying to make a meaningful, tractable contribution to
the conversation. ‘Please hand me that hammer, a metal object that is
green and next to your animal body’ is so strange in its overabundance
of precision that it’s likely to generate an implicature, or at least send
the audience off looking for one. Assuming that one intends no implicature, one ought to stay away from this way of talking. Referencing
philosophical zombies, the problem of other minds, or any other
subtle philosophical issue during a public political debate is also
4

H.P. Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation’, in Studies in the Ways of Words
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 24–42.
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likely to obscure whatever point one is trying to make (in addition to
being almost guaranteed to create a stumbling block for one’s
budding political career).
But these practical considerations are rather obvious and mundane,
and aren’t distinctive to philosophical discourse. We propose to set
them to the side. We will lump with them aesthetic considerations
(e.g. it would be good if a philosopher would at least consider
being silent if he or she is boring the life out of everyone), economic
considerations (e.g. perhaps philosophers at universities should not
teach courses without pay, as this would worsen an already bad job
market for philosophers), and academic considerations (e.g. silence
might be warranted if a philosopher believes that if she were to challenge a university chancellor on some small administrative matters,
this would likely lead to the closing down of the entire philosophy department). All of these will be set to the side.
Are there more philosophically interesting practical considerations
to consider? We can think of two. The first concerns the usefulness of
philosophy. Recall Romeo’s rebuke to the Friar in Romeo and Juliet
(Act 3, Scene 3, lines 57–60):
Hang up philosophy!
Unless philosophy can make a Juliet
Displant a town, reverse a prince’s doom,
It helps not, it prevails not. Talk no more.5
If Romeo’s point is just that there are times in life, especially in
periods of great loss, when mourning is more appropriate than philosophical reflection (or almost any other activity), then he is surely
correct. If his claim is rather that philosophy itself is useless, then
he is surely incorrect. While philosophy may not resurrect a dead
lover or destroy cities or rescue monarchs, part of what makes a
person who she is involves her beliefs on distinctively philosophical
questions (e.g. how ought I live?), towns are rarely made or intentionally destroyed without some kind of philosophy of power or conception of justice operating in the background, and it is hard to
evaluate the rise or fall of a prince without a social philosophy that
addresses monarchy.
In any event, much could be said to defend the usefulness of
philosophy, but we suspect that we’d be preaching to an impatient
choir. Instead, let’s turn to the second of our two more philosophically interesting practical considerations. It is this: Philosophy is
5

William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, edited by Horace Howard
Furness (Philadelphia: Lippincott’s Press, 1871), 1801.
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sometimes dangerous. Socrates was put to death for corrupting the
youth. Moritz Schlick was murdered for morally corrupting a particular youth (or at least this is one of several explanations that the assailant gave for his deed). Stalin piled Soviet intellectuals onto the
Philosophers’ Ships in 1922 and deported them to Germany. Their
new home, you’ll no doubt remember, didn’t turn out to be a more
congenial environment for intellectuals. Although inspired in part
by various philosophers, the leaders of the Nazi party weren’t
exactly known for their warm embrace of free philosophical investigation (see the fleeing members of the Vienna Circle). And, as we
all know, anti-intellectualism doesn’t just arise from political ideology. Throughout history, many sects of the world’s major religions
have turned against philosophers and other intellectuals, condemning those on the outside and excommunicating their own from the
inside.
Doing philosophy in the wrong place at the wrong time can get one
into all sorts of trouble. This can give a philosopher a practical reason
to be silent in a particular context. We assume that practical considerations like this can sometimes ground all-things-considered oughts
(e.g. when there is nothing that is morally at stake in the particular
situation). But when it’s the case that a philosopher ought (all
things considered) to be silent, and the relevant considerations
grounding this ought are purely practical, the prescription of silence
doesn’t apply to the philosopher qua philosopher, it’s a prescription
that applies to the philosopher qua self-interested individual. We
don’t have much to say about when a philosopher should be silent
qua self-interested individual. We wish to focus on the more philosophically interesting question of when a philosopher should be silent
qua philosopher.
What does it mean to say that, in a certain situation, a philosopher
ought (all things considered) to be silent qua philosopher? It means
that the individual, as a philosopher, ought to be silent; the considerations that ground the prescription to silence involve the individual’s
interests insofar as these follow from the individual’s role as a philosopher. But what does it mean to be a philosopher? At the risk of
revealing the extraordinary flatness of our feet, we’re inclined to say
that a philosopher is a lover of wisdom.6
So, are there considerations in favor of being silent that apply
to philosophers qua lovers of wisdom? Some philosophers have
thought so. We will canvass some of their suggestions below, dividing
them roughly into epistemic and moral considerations.
6

Note that one can’t truly love that with which one has no acquaintance.
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3. Epistemic Worries
3.1 It’s (Epistemically) Dangerous
We noted above that many sects of the world’s major religions have
turned against philosophers and other intellectuals. Why is this?
The concern has often been epistemic. The idea is that philosophy
is (epistemically) dangerous: too much thinking about a certain
topic might lead to a confused rejection of the truth (as it is
Divinely revealed by the Scriptures or prophets).7
The problem is that it is often difficult to distinguish philosophy
from sophistry. The philosopher is a lover of wisdom; the sophist is
a lover of the appearance of wisdom. It takes a considerable amount
of wisdom for one to be able to discern between the two. The
concern, on the part of the religious sects mentioned above, is that
most people, even those who study and teach philosophy for a
living, lack the required amount of wisdom. Thus, in engaging in
philosophical dialogue and thought, they are putting themselves
and others at risk for contracting false beliefs. And the stakes are
high. Since believing the truth (as understood by the sect) is seen
as being of life-or-death importance – with souls hanging in the
balance – any threat to such belief is to be resisted and, therefore, a
philosophical frame of mind is a dangerous one.
We agree that if souls are hanging in the balance, it is indeed important that we hit the mark in our beliefs. But this doesn’t give religious
philosophers a reason to be silent – or be silenced. It gives them a
reason to search for the truth with ever more urgency. It gives
them a reason to explore every path, to question and test assumptions,
and to subject their own views to the most withering criticism they
can muster (and if they can’t muster much, to outsource this
project to genuine critics of their beliefs). J.S. Mill had the right
idea in his On Liberty.8 Either the cherished belief in question is
false or it’s true. If it’s false, then subjecting it to tough scrutiny
gives the believer a chance at uncovering its falsity and correcting
her beliefs. If it’s true, then subjecting it to tough scrutiny gives
the believer a chance to strengthen her belief – a chance to gain a ‘livelier apprehension of the truth’ by seeing it pitted against falsehood.
7

We will consider a secular version of this worry below when we consider Hilary Kornblith’s argument against reason.
8
J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty (1859)’ in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Of course, there is the possibility that the truth won’t withstand
criticism, not because of any intrinsic deficiency, but rather
because the believer is taken in by seductive arguments against it or
because she lacks the ability to properly assess the relevant arguments. This is a real risk. If we just assume at the outset that our
beliefs are true, then this risk will obviously not seem to be worth
taking. But insofar as we care about the truth, we won’t merely
assume that the beliefs we start out with are true. If we think that
having the right beliefs in a domain is morally important, we have a
moral obligation to test our beliefs in that domain. Sheltering them
from scrutiny is not just an epistemic sin, it’s a moral sin.
We do risk exchanging the truth for a lie, but this is a risk we must
take, for otherwise we risk not exchanging a lie for the truth. Perhaps
someone will argue here that, given the risks on both sides, everyone
should be free to choose whichever risk better suits her tastes and constitution. But this is not so. If one shelters one’s belief in a lie from all
criticism, one is morally culpable for that belief. If, on the other hand,
one is taken in by misleading evidence or seductive but fallacious
arguments in the course of an honest and rigorous inquiry, one is
not morally culpable (or as culpable) for believing falsely; one has
done one’s best to believe the truth.
Another objector might accuse us of being overly romantic. Perhaps
we’re putting far too much faith in the power of philosophical reasoning. Maybe we should be skeptical of the sort of reasoning that is
characteristic of philosophy. Hilary Kornblith develops an argument
along these lines in his ‘Distrusting Reason’.9 The argument goes
roughly as follows: The practice of giving explicit reasons for belief –
especially ones involving complicated and subtle arguments – is vulnerable to being (often unconsciously) commandeered for the
purpose of constructing elaborate rationalizations for beliefs that are
held for other reasons. Thus reason-giving often props up poorly justified beliefs, and should be regarded with suspicion. This is a serious
charge and it will pay us to take a closer look at Kornblith’s argument
for it.10
The main character of his paper is a poor confused fellow by the
name of ‘Andrew’. Andrew, Kornblith tells us,

9

Hilary Kornblith, ‘Distrusting Reason’, in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy XXIII (1999), 181–196.
10
For a similar argument, see also Lara Buchak, ‘Instrumental
Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering’, Philosophical
Perspectives (2010) 85–120.
169

Jason Decker and Charles Taliaferro
has beliefs about the effectiveness of the death penalty in reducing the murder rate which are, at bottom, a product of wishful
thinking… [I]t is his view about the morality of the death
penalty that is driving his view about its effects… [His] reason
for his belief about the deterrent effect of the death penalty is
not a good reason. It would not withstand public, or even
private, scrutiny. But Andrew is unaware that this is why he believes as he does.11
Kornblith goes on to explain that Andrew is aware of various empirical data and studies. Some seem to favor his view; others seem to challenge it.
Andrew has latched on to the stories that fit with his antecedent
view. He remembers them better than the others, and when asked
about the death penalty, he is often able to cite relevant statistics
from them. He has less vivid memories of the other studies, those
that run counter to his belief about the death penalty’s effectiveness, and when he reads about these studies he is typically able to
mount some perfectly plausible methodological challenge to
them: some important variable was not controlled for, the
number of cases involved is not statistically significant, and so
on. Andrew is intelligent and articulate. He is very good at constructing reasons for his belief from the mixed evidence with
which he is confronted, and he is very good at presenting these
reasons to others in discussion about the issue. He believes that
the reasons that he presents are the reasons for which he holds
his belief. But he is wrong about this…When Andrew offers
rationalizations for his badly grounded opinions, his intelligence
works against him.12
Andrew is not alone, Kornblith fears; many of us engage in this sort
of rationalizing behavior. And to make matters worse, many of our
carefully constructed arguments in favor of our views rely at
various turns on plausibility judgments – judgments, Kornblith
fears, which are extremely ‘malleable’ and can be affected by the
same motivational distortions that give rise to rationalizations.
If cases like Andrew’s are rare, then we still have a reason to be cautious when confronted with the carefully constructed arguments of
others, or when we find ourselves constructing such arguments. If
cases like Andrew’s are the norm, then we have more than just a
11
12
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reason to be cautious; we have a reason to be skeptical of carefully constructed arguments. As Kornblith puts it:
If one believes that rationalization is extremely widespread and
that plausibility judgments are extremely malleable, then one
may be well advised to be skeptical of rational argument. Under
these conditions, attending to the logical niceties of argument
would be no more useful in attaining ones epistemic goals than attending to the eye color of the person offering the argument…13
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with logic or good reasoning
itself on this view; any such view would be absurd. Rather, as a
matter of empirical fact, it is argued, those who tend to present
their arguments with the greatest logical perspicuity are also, on
those occasions, most frequently offering rationalizations, or at
least so frequently offering rationalizations as to make the best
epistemic policy the one of adopting the skeptic’s presumption
[i.e., that the argument is just a post hoc rationalization and is
most likely the result of sidelining important evidence and
considerations]…14
If the reason-skeptic’s empirical claim is right, then we have a reason
to be skeptical when anyone tries to present a subtle, careful, and rigorous argument for a view. As the case of Andrew suggests, we ought
to extend this skepticism even to ourselves and our own carefully constructed justifications for our beliefs. And – to reconnect to our main
concern – since it is the very business of philosophy to construct such
arguments, the skeptic has given us a general reason to distrust philosophers and their arguments. Any philosopher who sees the problem
here seems to have a powerful reason to be (philosophically) silent.
Kornblith stops short of embracing this distrust of reasoning. He
does, however, assert that the skeptic’s argument has considerable
force and deserves to be taken seriously. Indeed, he holds that ‘[i]t
is only by taking the skeptic’s hypothesis seriously and, if possible,
laying it to rest, that our trust in public reason may be fully rational’.15
We are considerably less impressed with the skeptic’s argument.
First, we think that Kornblith pays insufficient attention to an
important distinction between two kinds of reason. When we talk
of someone’s ‘reasons for believing’, we could have two very different
things in mind:
13
14
15

Ibid., 185.
Ibid., 189–90.
Ibid., 193.
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Epistemic Reasons for Belief:
An epistemic reason for belief in φ is a consideration that
justifies – or is taken by the believer to justify – belief in φ.
Causal Reasons for Belief:
A causal reason for a belief in φ is anything that is part of the
total cause of the belief’s existence.
There is a world of difference between the two kinds of reasons. It
would be an enormous confusion to conflate epistemic reasons and
causal reasons. The sizable lesion on poor Ned’s brain is a causal
reason for his belief that there is loud music playing in the room. It
explains why (in the causal sense) Ned has the belief in question. It
is obviously not, however, an epistemic reason for Ned’s belief.
Indeed, to assert otherwise would be to commit a category mistake.
Brain lesions aren’t considerations, so they are not considerations
that justify – nor, unless the believer is very confused, are they
taken by the believer to justify – particular beliefs. Epistemic
reasons are propositions, not clumps of tissue (or even events involving clumps of tissue).
In his discussion of Andrew’s belief in the effectiveness of the death
penalty, Kornblith appears to conflate epistemic reasons and causal
reasons. Andrew’s belief, Kornblith says, is a product of wishful
thinking. Okay; well, that’s a point about the causal origin of the
belief. So far we don’t know what considerations (if any) are the epistemic reasons for his belief. Kornblith goes on to suggest that Andrew
is confused about the ‘reasons’ for his belief. When he says what
Andrew takes his reasons to be, it’s clear that we’re now talking
about epistemic reasons (Andrew takes his arguments to justify his
belief). Kornblith suggests that Andrew is wrong about what his
reasons are, since his belief is really the result of wishful thinking.
But, the latter claim concerns causal reasons, and the former seems
to concern epistemic reasons. Andrew’s confusion about the causal
reasons for his belief doesn’t suggest that Andrew is wrong about
his epistemic reasons. Perhaps Kornblith thinks that since Andrew
is confused about the causal origin of his belief, he is also confused
about the considerations he takes to justify the belief. But this looks
like a non sequitur. It’s hard to see how one confusion would inevitably lead to the other.
To further defend poor Andrew: Rationalization, as Kornblith describes it, doesn’t seem obviously bad or confused. Suppose Andrew
172
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finds himself strongly believing something that he hopes is true, but
he doesn’t yet have sufficient epistemic reason to believe it. So he does
a little investigation to see if there are compelling epistemic reasons to
ground his belief. He finds that there are indeed compelling reasons
and that potential underminers for the belief can be rebutted. This
kind of ‘rationalization’ (if one wants to call it that) seems like it is contributing to Andrew’s belief being more reasonable than it once was.
(Even if you don’t think that it’s ideally reasonable, you should admit
that it’s at least more reasonable than it once was.) When Andrew later
cites these considerations as his epistemic reasons, he’s not confused
about his epistemic reasons. These are indeed his epistemic reasons.
Is he confused about his causal reasons? Maybe, but maybe not; we
haven’t been told enough about Andrew to say one way or the
other. Kornblith’s way of trying to make Andrew seem confused
appears to conflate epistemic and causal reasons.
But perhaps the idea is supposed to be this: Andrew is confused
about the causal reasons for his belief, for he thinks that it’s his
appreciation of the epistemic reasons for believing in the effectiveness
of the death penalty that is the primary causal reason for his believing
in its effectiveness. And perhaps Kornblith is supposing that Andrew
would continue to hold the belief in question even if he didn’t
appreciate these epistemic reasons. However, all this would show is
that Andrew’s belief is causally overdetermined, not that Andrew’s
appreciation of the epistemic reasons isn’t a cause of his current
belief.
So it’s not at all clear what Kornblith has in mind with his talk of
‘rationalization’, nor is it clear that rationalization is an epistemic vice.
Consequently, Kornblith’s skeptical argument seems to be under
developed, at best.
An even more serious worry is that his argument seems to be epistemically self-incriminating. Insofar as we take the argument seriously,
we must take ourselves to be unjustified in taking the argument
seriously. It’s a philosophical argument the conclusion of which
entails that we should be highly skeptical of philosophical arguments.
Indeed, as the thought goes, the better the philosophical argument
(by usual philosophical standards), the more we should be suspicious
of it. So, if we are convinced by the skeptic’s philosophical argument,
we should believe that we are unjustified in being convinced by it.
And, of course, the more the argument convinces us to be suspicious
of itself, the less reason we’ll have to be suspicious of it, since our
reason for being suspicious of the argument was grounded in the argument itself. We would be epistemically unjustified in accepted any
argument with this embarrassing character – that is, any argument
173
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that yields the conclusion that we are justified in accepting it only
(and precisely) insofar as we don’t accept it.
Kornblith considers a nearby objection:
The challenge I have in mind is that the skeptic’s view is self-undermining, for the skeptic on the one hand proclaims that the
activity of reason-giving is not connected to the truth and that
we should therefore be unmoved by it, and yet, on the other
hand, in order to convince us of this particular view, the
skeptic offers us reasons. If the skeptic is right about the activity
of reason-giving, then her argument would not, and should not,
convince us. According to the challenger, skepticism about
reason-giving is thus self-undermining.16
Kornblith suggests two responses to this objection. The first
response is that the skeptic might simply be offering a reductio to
friends of reason (just to have a label, let’s call them rationalists).
The skeptic, Kornblith says, ‘may be seen as merely showing that
the position of the person who puts his trust in reason-giving is
internally inconsistent; that is, it fails to meet that person’s own standards’. Unfortunately, Kornblith doesn’t develop this line of
response and it’s unclear how it’s supposed to work. If the argument
really is a reductio of the rationalists’ position, then it should start with
premises that the rationalist accepts and derive some contradiction or
absurdity from them. But the skeptic’s argument doesn’t appear to
start with claims that the rationalist will accept. In explaining the
skeptic’s starting point, Kornblith says,
What the skeptic believes is that there is a fairly strong correlation
between the logical perspicuity with which arguments tend to be
offered and the amount of rationalization that underlies them.17
Elsewhere he explains that the skeptic doesn’t hold this on a priori
grounds. ‘[H]er presumption about reasoning,’ he says, ‘is seen as
an empirical hypothesis that, on her view, is well supported by available evidence. We may understand the skeptics position only if we see
it in that light’.18
There are two problems here. The first is that the rationalist does
not accept the skeptic’s claim that there is a strong correlation
between logical perspicuity and amount of rationalization.
Presumably, she doesn’t find the empirical evidence to support this
16
17
18
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assertion. Second, the skeptic is in no position to disagree with the
rationalist on the first point. How is the skeptic’s finding her conjecture to be well supported by the available evidence any different than
Andrew’s finding his conjecture to be well supported by the available
evidence? Shouldn’t the skeptic be skeptical of her own reasons for
believing the conjecture? Shouldn’t she presume that her own judgments about what’s plausible based on the empirical evidence are as
suspect as Andrew’s? By the skeptics own lights, the answer is ‘yes,
she should!’
If you’re wondering what possible unconscious motivation the
skeptic could have for wanting to bury reason, you won’t have to
look far: try intellectual laziness. If she thinks she is justified in a
general distrust of careful, logically perspicuous arguments, she
won’t be bothered with the task of trying to carefully assess her
own views or the opposing views of others. It appears that she will
have license to just go with her gut and leave it at that. Whenever
she is challenged, she can presume that the challenger is just spinning
some post hoc story that is propped up by bias and fueled by distorting motivations. Whenever she is asked to support her own views, she
can politely decline, lest she be guilty of the same epistemic crimes.
But this is just laziness, and it is indefensible laziness. Any attempt
that the skeptic gives to defend it will be undermined by its own conclusion. The skeptic’s own view entails that we should presume that
any reason that she gives for accepting it is a piece of sophistry. And of
course, to us rationalists, it already smacks of sophistry. So we can
agree with the skeptic on that much.
So it won’t do to say that the skeptic is just offering a reductio of
the rationalist’s position. The starting points of the argument are
not the rationalist’s, thus the argument is not one that the rationalist
needs to accept as compelling. Furthermore, the skeptic herself
shouldn’t find the argument compelling, given the argument’s conclusion. So the argument can be compelling neither for the speaker
nor for the audience. Everyone should distrust this particular bit of
reasoning.
Kornblith offers a second response to the self-undermining worry
on behalf of the skeptic:
[T]he skeptic does not accept the practice of reason-giving at face
value, [but] this does not mean that the skeptic is forced to reject
every case of reason-giving as bogus. Rather, her view about
the frequency of reason-giving as reason-responsive, and
reason-giving as mere rationalization, is just the reverse of the
person who places his trust in the practice of giving reasons.
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Consider the attitude of a rational and cautious person when
buying a used car. Such a person will be faced with a good deal
of reason-giving on the part of the used car salesman, and it
may well be that, if taken at face value, the reasons offered for
various purchases are wholly convincing. From the point of
view of logic alone, the used car salesman’s reasoning is impeccable. But the rational and cautious person does not take the
used car salesman’s arguments at face value. Rather, in this situation, although one does not simply ignore everything which is
said, one does not simply evaluate the logical cogency of the arguments offered either. One may certainly approach argument
in this way at the used car lot, while forming beliefs on the
basis of argument on other occasions.
Now the skeptic about reason-giving sees the practice of
reason-giving generally in much the way that we all regard the
arguments of the used car salesman… Reason-giving is not automatically irrelevant epistemically, on the skeptics view; it should
simply be regarded as irrelevant until proven otherwise.19
This response won’t do either. First, no one is suggesting (we hope!)
that one should ever evaluate arguments solely on the basis of logical
cogency (or lack thereof). We teach our freshman undergraduates the
distinction between validity and soundness and take great pains to
illustrate for them how a perfectly valid argument can nevertheless
be a terrible argument. The rationalist certainly isn’t lagging
behind our undergraduates on this point.
Second, if the skeptic regards reason-giving as epistemically irrelevant until proven otherwise, she ought never to cease regarding
it as epistemically irrelevant. For to prove it relevant, she will need
to have some reasons for regarding it as relevant, and she is committed to taking those reasons to be epistemically irrelevant unless
they have already been proven otherwise. She is caught in the old
circle. She must have already proven that some reason-giving is epistemically relevant in order to prove that any reason-giving is epistemically relevant. Since this is impossible, she must always and
forever take reason-giving to be epistemically irrelevant.
Kornblith’s conservative skeptic is in quite a predicament.
As far as we can see, the charge of self-incrimination stands. By the
view’s own lights, the skeptic must either (i) give no reasons whatsoever for her view – in which case it’s hard to see why anyone else
should take her view seriously, or (ii) give reasons for her view that
19

176

Ibid., 187.

When Should Philosophers Be Silent?
even she herself shouldn’t take seriously. Thus, Kornblith’s secular
argument for philosophical silence appears to fare no better than
the religious one we dispensed with earlier.
3.2 Troubles with Concepts and Competence
Let us, then, look elsewhere for broadly epistemic reasons for philosophers to be silent. Wittgenstein’s concluding remark from the
Tractatus is a good place to start. Here it is suggested that, concerning matters ‘whereof one cannot speak’, one must be silent. The idea
seems to be that if it’s impossible for one to speak intelligibly about a
certain topic, one shouldn’t try to speak about it; one should be
silent. One could see this as following from a stronger maxim: if
one doesn’t know how to speak intelligibly about a certain topic,
one should be silent. It being impossible to speak intelligibly
about a certain topic is one reason one might not know how to
speak intelligibly about it, but there are other reasons that one
might lack this know-how. It could be, for instance, that one lacks
the necessary concepts to think and speak intelligibly about the
subject, or it could be that one possesses the concepts but lacks
the competence to effectively deploy them to think and speak
about the subject.
Let’s start with cases where it is (supposedly) impossible to speak
intelligibly about a certain topic. There are two reasons that this
might be so:
Ineffability:
The topic involves a realm of genuine facts, but they’re ineffable.
Non-Existence:
The appearance of a topic is entirely illusory.20
20

It’s perhaps worth noting that even if a topic is nonexistent or ineffable,
this might not be enough to force philosophers into silence. There is, for
example, Plato’s puzzling reference in the Republic to the good being beyond
existence and Quine’s puzzling claim in Word and Object that while linguistic
meanings don’t exist, if they had existed, the Verification Criterion of
Meaning would have characterized them. There are even philosophers who
hold that impossibilities can be conceived and discussed. This is not implausible,
since, at the very least, one ought to be able to construct meaningful reductio
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The later Wittgenstein of the Investigations (1958) made an ineffability claim about private sense perceptions.21
“But you will surely admit that there is a difference between painbehaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any
pain?” – Admit it? What greater difference could there be? –
“And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.” – Not at all. It is not a something, but
not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing
would serve just as well as a something about which nothing
could be said.22
So the claim here is clearly an ineffability claim, not a non-existence
claim. There is a realm of facts in the vicinity, it’s just that we can’t say
anything about them.
The earlier Wittenstein of the Tractatus, on the other hand, wasn’t
just making an ineffability claim at the end of his philosophical manifesto, he was making a non-existence claim. What was the target?
Traditional philosophy. In proposition 6.53, he says:
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science,
i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then
always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical,
to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs
in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the
other – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him
philosophy – but it would be the only strictly correct method.23
You might be tempted here to point out to Wittgenstein that proposition 6.53 itself falls squarely within the realm of philosophy (it’s
certainly not a claim of natural science!). But before you congratulate
yourself on a clean and decisive refutation of the Great Sage, read on
to proposition 6.54:

arguments against impossibilia and evaluate substantive indicative and counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents.
21
Now is as good a time as any for us to caution that any claims we make
about Wittgenstein (both early and late) are subject to contradiction by
Wittgenstein scholars – such being the penalty for attributions to
Wittgenstein (to adapt a phrase from Quine).
22
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition,
Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1958), 102e.
23
Op. cit. note 1, 187–189.
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My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands
me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out
through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw
away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.24
And this is where he abruptly concludes his essay with ‘Whereof one
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’. Interestingly, this also
doesn’t look like a claim of natural science, so one assumes that it
must be thrown away with the rest of the ladder. (We’re unsure
how, exactly, one is supposed to throw it away, but let’s not let this
worry detain us.)
The Other Great Sage, David Hume, had earlier complained about
metaphysics, and any other area of discourse where the roots of
meaning could not be traced directly back to sense perceptions. If
you’ve read Hume’s Enquiry, you no doubt recall these memorable lines:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles,
what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any
volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us
ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it
then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion.25
Some advice! The logical positivists, inspired by the Great Sages, also
made forceful arguments along these lines concerning moral discourse
and metaphysics. Their claim was not that the moral and metaphysical
truths are ineffable; their claim was that there are no such truths.
Metaphysical and moral ‘claims’ are just pseudo-claims. If this is so,
philosophers have a compelling reason, qua lovers of wisdom, to stop
trying to make genuine claims in these areas. What should they do
instead? Among their options are: (i) to take Wittgenstein’s advice
and practice philosophy-as-linguistic-therapy, (ii) to leave philosophy
and become natural scientists, and (iii) to organize a good oldfashioned Humean book burning.26
24

Ibid., 189.
David Hume, ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ in
Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles
of Morals, edited by Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 165.
26
Hilary Putnam suggests a more respectful approach in a chapter
entitled ‘“Ontology”: An Obituary’ of his Ethics Without Ontology
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). After comparing ontology
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Well, what should we say about the arguments that led to this sad
conclusion? We’re inclined to think that all of the ineffability and
non-existence arguments we’ve mentioned so far are bad arguments.
We lack the space and inclination (and maybe the talent) to rebut
them all. Suffice it to say that all of the arguments we’ve mentioned
so far seem to us to rely on faulty philosophical theories of meaning.
This is particularly striking in the case of the writings of the logical
positivists, wherein a relatively clear and explicit criterion of meaningfulness is invoked (the Verification Criterion) – one which (as it
has been pointed out many times by many philosophers) unfortunately seems to straightforwardly dismiss itself as meaningless.
Instead of confronting the arguments one by one, we’d like to suggest
what we feel is a sound general approach to such arguments: Whenever
we’re faced with a non-existence or impossibility claim, a compelling
response is to produce an item of the sort that is said not to exist or to
be impossible. If your student bristles as the claim that there are no unicorns,27 he could easily satisfy you by producing a specimen. Obviously,
this strategy works all the better when the claim is an impossibility
claim. It doesn’t take an expert in modal logic to discern that actuality
entails possibility. If Wittgenstein tells you that it is not possible to
say anything about private sensations, it is a compelling response to
say something intelligible about private sensations. If A.J. Ayer tells
you that it is not possible to say anything meaningful that can’t be verified in principle, it is a compelling response to say something that is
meaningful that can’t be verified in principle. If the Humean tells you
that metaphysics is all sophistry and illusion, it’s a compelling response
to produce some metaphysics that’s not just sophistry and illusion.

to a stinking horse corpse (that’s not the respectful part), Putnam offers this
on its behalf:
[I]n Plato and Aristotle it [ontology] represented the vehicle for conveying
many genuine philosophical insights. The insights still preoccupy all of us
in philosophy who have any historical sense at all. But the vehicle has long
since outlived its usefulness. (85)
Ontology is a vehicle that one shouldn’t want to take – you’re not going to get
very far riding a stinking horse corpse! – but it’s at least a vehicle with a storied
history. It used to be useful for getting interesting places, even if it was getting
there in a confused way. It can at least be admired for that (and presumably discussed in the context of a historical investigation of its uses).
27
One of us had such a student. How serious he was being was shockingly unclear.
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Even if Wittgenstein, Ayer, and Hume are right (and we think that
they’re not), philosophers ought to try to show that they’re not. For
non-existence and impossibility claims are a notoriously tricky lot. As
we’ve said, it’s a straightforward matter to conclusively refute a nonexistence claim (one needs only to produce that which is said not to
exist). On the other hand, it’s a very tricky matter to conclusively establish a non-existence claim. Looking here and there and not finding the
object in question is not enough to force one to accept non-existence.
Even if one searches everywhere for the object without finding it,
that is not enough, for the object might also be in motion or might
be undetectable through the particular means one is employing. One
would have to search everywhere, everywhen, and everyhow in order
to conclusively establish a non-existence claim, and this is no small task.
Of course, one could instead try to establish non-existence through
impossibility. But in many cases, this path is even more fraught.
Modal space is expansive and embracing. It’s difficult to show that
something doesn’t exist anywhere in it. For instance, if one wants
to establish that it is impossible to say anything about private
phenomenal experiences, one would need to not just establish that
our current concepts and languages leave us unable to say anything
about them, but also that any possible conceptual scheme or language
would be inadequate to the task. If one establishes the former without
the latter, one will not have supported the prescription of philosophical silence on the matter, one will have positively encouraged philosophers to create new, more powerful conceptual schemes to allow us to
express what is currently ineffable.
It is, however, true that if a philosopher currently lacks the conceptual resources to speak intelligibly about a certain matter, and is unwilling or unable to improve those conceptual resources until they’re
up to the task, she should (qua philosopher) be silent on the matter. If
one loves wisdom, one will not willingly speak nonsense on any
matter. Thus, when considering whether one should, as a philosopher, speak on a certain matter, there is a competency constraint:
The Competency Constraint:
If a philosopher lacks the competency to say anything clear and
coherent about a subject, the philosopher ought, qua philosopher, to be silent (at least until she develops the required
competency).
There are certainly many notable philosophers who have run afoul of
this principle. In Talking Philosophy: A Wordbook, A.W. Sparkes has
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an entry ‘Obscure, abstruse, obtuse’, and he offers this passage from
Hegel as a case of ‘non-vague, non-ambiguous obscurity’:
This finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in
the process of realising it, the material, which is employed as a
means, is only externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it. But, as a matter of fact, the object is the
notion implicitly: and thus when the notion, in the shape of
the End, is realised in the object, we have but the manifestation
of the inner nature of the object itself. Objectivity is thus,
as it were, only a covering under which the notion lies
concealed.28
This is certainly obscure, and Sparkes was perhaps overly generous
to call it non-vague and non-ambiguous. Suppose this is all Hegel
could say on whatever topic he was trying to address in the passage.
If he is completely unable to address his topic with clarity and
coherence, he should pass over the given topic in silence, at least
until he has developed some competency with respect to it.
Alover of wisdom does not revel in the obscure and murky. She
revels in clarity.
We do not, by the way, take this to be a constraint that shows undue
favoritism toward so-called ‘analytic’ philosophy over so-called ‘continental’ philosophy. The best philosophers, on either side, strive to
say something clear and coherent, and there are philosophers from
both traditions who are commendable in this respect. There are
also philosophers on both sides who wallow in the obscure. Some
of these philosophers have a rather remarkable gift for stringing together words in a way that is aesthetically pleasing and has the ring
of profundity. But what they practice is not philosophy, and it’s
hardly even sophistry. Philosophers, qua philosophers, ought not
be so entranced by the sound of their own words that they forget to
say something with some content.
There might well be certain apparent topics for discussion that turn
out to be mere pseudo-topics. This leads us to a second constraint:
The Intelligibility Constraint:
If there is no genuine subject matter for discussion, philosophers (qua philosophers) ought to be silent with respect to
the pseudo-subject.
28

A. W. Sparkes, Talking Philosophy: A Wordbook (London: Routledge,
1991), 54.
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If, for instance, the logical positivists are right that metaphysics consists of meaningless pseudo-claims, it would be best for a lover of
wisdom (as a lover of wisdom) to avoid forming metaphysical
pseudo-beliefs and making metaphysical pseudo-assertions.
In practice, however, these constraints will not lead to much philosophical silence. First, a philosopher trying to discharge her duties
qua philosopher will have to make a judgment on whether there is a
genuine subject matter and whether she is competent to speak to it.
Part of how she can decide whether or not she’s dealing with a
genuine subject matter is by seeing if she can make meaningful, coherent assertions in the (purported) domain of inquiry. If she can,
it’s a genuine domain of inquiry. It’s possible, however, that there
are illusions of meaningfulness; this is what the logical positivists,
for example, thought about metaphysics, and early Wittgenstein apparently thought about all of philosophy. If they’re right, however,
the illusion is an extraordinarily convincing one. The best way for a
philosopher to test whether or not the appearance of meaningfulness
is illusory is to put as much pressure on the area of discourse as possible. Hopefully, the artificial edges of the illusion will become apparent as the philosopher tries to give careful and exacting scrutiny to the
(supposed) subject matter. The best way she can see if a subject
matter is intelligible is by trying her best to make sense of it.
Of course, she must also consider carefully any general arguments
against the subject matter’s intelligibility. The metaphysician, for
example, must confront the anti-metaphysical arguments of the positivists. Defending the relevant domain against these arguments will
bring the philosopher even further from silence. Now she is not
only diligently working out her views in the first-order domain,
but also confronting second-order questions about the domain
itself. So, although a dutiful philosopher will try her best not to
violate the intelligibility and competence constraints, she must
balance this against and even greater duty to seek the truth. In practice, this will lead to less philosophical silence rather than more.
4. Moral Worries
A third constraint on philosophical inquiry is suggested by Stump’s
remarks about philosophical discussion of the Holocaust:
The Moral Constraint:
If taking up a certain topic in a particular philosophical discussion would somehow obscure its moral status, a philosopher
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has a reason (qua philosopher) to avoid discussing the topic in
question (in this context).
We agree wholeheartedly with this principle; but we think that it’s
hard to imagine cases of serious philosophical discussions where it
would apply. If Stump is correct that considering whether the occurrence of the Holocaust renders theism implausible will (by its very
nature) make us think of the Holocaust as simply one example in an
academic disputation, that would be a compelling reason not to
engage in such philosophical reflection. However, we think that
Stump is unconvincing on this front. Discussing something serious
in a philosophical spirit is not a way of disrespecting it. Of course,
if what we’re really engaged in is mere rhetoric or sophistry, then
Stump is right that we ought to avoid discussion of the Holocaust.
Rhetoric (for its own sake) and sophistry are just games. But true
philosophy is not. When engaged in the latter enterprise, we show
no insensitivity to a moral horror by discussing it.
Ruling out academic discussion of the Holocaust – particularly in
relation to assessing the reasonableness of theistic faith – strikes us as a
severe limitation. Indeed, it seems dialectically unfair in the context of
a discussion of the problem of evil. It is the existence of such evil – evil
so awe-inspiring and horrifying that mere mention of it could be seen
as unspeakably awful – that grounds the atheist’s assertion that there is
not, in fact, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God.
Of course the fact that it’s dialectically unfair isn’t itself decisive.
Again, if the conversation in which we’re engaged is just part of a
silly game or competition, then Stump is surely right that we
should steer clear of mentions of the Holocaust, lest we make light
of an event of great gravity. But is academic philosophy just
another silly game or competition? We like to think not! Academic
philosophy, at its best, concerns itself with the quest for truth and
clarity, and not as part of some trivial game or competition, but
rather as a constitutive part of the search for – and love of – wisdom.29
To rule out of court the most compelling examples of evil in a philosophical discussion of the problem of evil is to fail to take entirely
seriously the very serious and troubling charge that the atheist
brings before the theist. And to rule them out for the reason that
Stump gives seems to also fail to take philosophy itself entirely
seriously. A successful theodicy must confront head-on the most horrifying and the most awful evils that exist – those evils that we don’t
29

This is academic philosophy at its best. How often it’s at its best is a
fine question.
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want to so much as mention, let alone dwell upon. And constructing
such a theodicy (if it’s possible – and we hope and believe that it is) is
more that just an academic exercise. The problem of evil is not just a
philosophers’ problem. It is a problem that grips ordinary folks and
academics alike, and it gets to the heart of some of humankind’s
deepest questions about itself and the universe it inhabits.
Philosophy in general, and this question in particular, is no silly game.
If Stump were right about philosophical discussion of the
Holocaust, one would have to wonder when, if ever, a discussion of
the Holocaust would be in order. Could moral realists point out the
uncomfortable and implausible claims the moral antirealist needs to
accept concerning the Holocaust? Could historians argue about the
ultimate causes and effects of the Holocaust? Could psychologists
relate their work on how humans react to perceived authority
figures to the grotesque acts that were committed in Nazi
Germany? Would these amount to taking the Holocaust as simply
one more topic for academic disputations? If so, the demand for
silence on the subject is quite far-reaching and one worries that the
subject might begin to disappear altogether from the public consciousness, which would itself be unspeakably awful.
And – if we may slide a bit further down the slippery slope – can
Hollywood producers or documentarians treat the subject? It would
be strange to suggest that the topic is off limits for serious Hollywood
producers and documentarians. But it would be far stranger to
suggest that these artists could approach the subject but that it’s off
limits for serious philosophers – philosophers struggling with the
deepest and most important questions and concerns that trouble the
human mind. Our view is that such philosophers must be morally permitted to discuss the Holocaust in the context of discussions of evil,
free-will, etc., if any of the other academics or artists we’ve mentioned
are permitted to study the events of the Holocaust from their particular
perspectives. And it seems obvious to us that they are permitted to do so.
We will not, however, argue for the right of non-serious philosophers, academics, and artists to use the Holocaust in their parlor
games, competitions, or works of art. If this is all Stump had in
mind, then she’s surely right that so-using the Holocaust is unspeakably awful. But serious philosophers discussing the problem of evil
belong outside the scope of her censure.
Let us, then, consider a different moral argument. In his ‘Persons,
character and morality’,30 Bernard Williams discusses an example
30
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In Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
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from Charles Fried31 concerning a man who is in a position to save
either of two people, but not both of them. One happens to be the
man’s wife. Fried’s question concerns whether the man must treat
the two victims with impartiality if he is going to approach the situation in the way that morality demands. Williams considers that there
might be a way of providing a moral justification for the man to show
partiality in such a situation, but he feels that there would be something objectionable about the man’s rehearsing that justification for
himself before making the decision to save his wife. To adopt
Williams’ memorable phrase, such a man would have ‘one thought
too many’. His reason for saving his wife shouldn’t be his subtle
moral argument granting him an exception to an otherwise predominant impartiality constraint; his reason should be that the victim he
will save is his wife.
Suppose the man in question is a philosopher. We seem to have a
case, then, where it would be strange for a philosopher to engage in
philosophical inquiry. Indeed, we’re inclined to say that it would
be morally problematic, especially if time is of the essence. The
moral considerations in favor of his saving his wife should be particularly salient to him, should he need to search for them. But if he needs
to search for them, it is a sign of moral dysfunction. Our view is that it
is not just morally permissible for the man to save his wife in this
context, it is obviously morally permissible. Indeed, we’d go so far
as to say that it’s morally required. These things won’t be obvious
to everyone, particularly those who have bought into certain normative theories, but they should be. Why is it morally required for the
man to favor his wife in this situation? The simple answer is the
natural one that Williams gives (though he seems not to see it as a
moral reason): she’s his wife. Spouses have special moral obligations
to each other, and one of the obligations is to to protect the other
and promote his or her interests even above one’s own. One has
these obligations in virtue of entering into a voluntary union with
the other. One doesn’t have this particularly weighty obligation to
complete strangers.
Williams is quite right that, if the man has to rehearse this justification to himself before deciding to save his wife, he is having one
thought too many. It’s not that these aren’t the reasons he is permitted to save her, though; it’s just that if one needs to rehearse
this justification to oneself in this sort of situation, it is a sign of
serious moral dysfunction. Being a non-defective moral agent
31
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involves having a certain kind of moral know-how, a sensibility that
allows one to see immediately that certain things are to be done and
certain other things aren’t to be done. If one reverts to explicit inference in cases where one should see the answer immediately, this is a
sign of dysfunction. This isn’t just the case in the moral realm; it
holds quite generally. Suppose one is in a life-or-death situation
where, for some reason or other, one must sum the numbers 3 and
5. If one works through a complicated deductive argument starting
with Peano’s Axioms to get to the answer, this is a sign of dysfunction
(qua mathematical reasoner). One should be able to see the answer to
this particular problem without running a deductive argument from
Peano’s Axioms. Importantly, it’s not that there’s anything wrong
with such an argument – the problem is just with someone who
needs to rehearse it in a life-or-death situation. Likewise with the
moral argument for saving one’s wife over the stranger. There’s
nothing wrong with the argument, but one shouldn’t need it in
certain situations. In other situations, however, these matters are
worthy of serious thought and consideration.
So where does all of this leave us?
5. Whereof some think one cannot or should not speak, thereof
one should still try to speak at least a little
We strongly suspect that the title of our subject heading will not
become a catch phrase. But that is our conclusion.
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